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Yemen’s ongoing domestic crisis has 
profound regional and global implica-
tions. This is due to the country’s unique 
combination of a geostrategically sensitive 
location, the stubborn weakness of state 
institutions, linkages with transnational 
terrorism, a prominent role in the regional 
weapons market, and, crucially, the suspected 
existence and use of nerve gas. These inter-
related challenges might constitute a serious 
impediment to the short-term success and 
long-term sustainability of the Middle East 
Conference (MEC). This gathering on the 
establishment of a regional zone free of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
their delivery vehicles (DVs) was mandated 
by the 2010 Review Conference of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
In this context, Yemen’s ongoing domestic 
crisis thus requires urgent attention by 
policy-makers in the region and beyond. 
The Importance of Yemen 
in the Context of the 
Middle East Conference
While in a geographical and political sense 
Yemen is far from being a central actor in 
the envisioned MEC, its political future 
could easily shape the gathering on several 
levels. First, the Middle East Conference 
aims at establishing a WMD/DVs Free 
Zone. On the one hand, Yemen is a party 
to all three legal documents banning 
weapons of mass destruction: the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
In addition, Sana’a has embraced the Gulf 
Cooperation Council’s (GCC) call for a Gulf 
WMD Free Zone, independent of Israeli 
nuclear policy. On the other hand, when it 
comes to the problématique of WMD and 
proliferation, Yemen might store chemical 
weapons, depending on whether rumors 
about the use of nerve gas against anti-
government protesters in early 2011 turn 
out to be true. In addition, Yemen imported 
various WMD-capable aircraft and missiles 
and probably still operates most of them (see 
Table No. 1). In the aircraft realm, Yemeni 
decision-makers from the North, the South, 
and the uniﬁ ed country alike have mostly 
received Soviet/Russian ﬁ ghter jets and 
bombers.1
The current level of instability and the threat 
of further deterioration could thus spoil any 
serious arms control effort in Yemen. This is 
particularly troublesome since the country, 
given its history and afﬁ liation with the 
Arab League, will have to be part of far-
reaching regional disarmament initiatives. 
The prospect of an Arab state with an uncon-
trolled chemical arsenal is likely to affect 
Israeli and Iranian calculations with regard 
to the MEC. Both states are suspicious of 
the Arab League and tensions between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, which is particularly inﬂ u-
ential in Yemen, have recently worsened.
Second, with a long history as one of the 
region’s eminent weapons markets, Yemen 
has the potential to serve as a major gateway 
for illicit weapons, both conventional and 
unconventional, entering the Arab peninsula 
and other parts of the Arab East. If the 
situation escalates, states with an interest 
in such technology might, for instance, try 
to obtain missiles and their spare parts or 
attempt to gain access to sensitive material 
from the country’s suspected chemical 
warheads. This could contribute to the prolif-
eration of delivery systems as well as WMD 
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Abstract
The preparatory debate of the Middle East 
Conference is dominated by major regional 
actors. Politically and geographically, Yemen 
represents the regional periphery and is not the 
focus of signiﬁ cant non-proliferation concerns. 
Sana’a has ratiﬁ ed all three legal documents 
against nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons. However, it is not altogether clear 
whether Yemen has consistently lived up to 
all its commitments. The regime of former 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh stood accused 
of having used nerve gas against protesters 
demanding his ouster. In addition, Yemen 
possesses a number of aircraft and missiles 
which might be used as delivery vehicles for 
weapons of mass destruction. The mandate 
for the Middle East Conference requires their 
abolishment as well – a task that could be 
made more difﬁ cult by the current instability.
Moreover, Yemen’s status as a failing state 
at a geostrategically sensitive location poses 
profound challenges to regional and global 
security. Should Yemen become a failed state, 
human trafﬁ cking as well as weapons and 
drug smuggling could increase. The potential 
access of terrorist groups to chemical weapons 
or the means of producing them could seriously 
undermine regional and global security. The 
ongoing tensions in the country’s North also 
raise the specter of Yemen being drawn into 
the wider competition over regional inﬂ uence 
between Riyadh and Tehran. With Iran’s tradi-
tional vehicles of power projection engulfed 
in the fall-out of the ‘Arab Spring’, Yemen’s 
instability offers Tehran an alternative route 
for pressuring Riyadh and its Western allies. 
Thus, addressing Yemen’s domestic crisis is 
of concern for the success of the Middle East 
Conference. 
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to curry favor with individual tribes or the 
effective manipulation of tribal customs to 
turn them against each other when necessary. 
Saleh once described his way of governing 
as “dancing on the head of snakes.”2 This 
approach effectively determined and 
characterized politics and decision-making 
processes more than the formal govern-
mental and administrative structures. It has 
contributed to inefﬁ cient, underdeveloped, 
and corrupt state institutions and eroded 
the state’s capacity to fulﬁ ll its key tasks 
such as providing safety and security for its 
citizens, basic social welfare, or safeguarding 
the rule of law and political participation. 
The resulting crisis appears almost 
overwhelming: in 2011, the ‘Failed State 
Index’ of the Fund for Peace ranks Yemen as 
13th of 177 states.3 In addition to thousands 
of refugees from the Horn of Africa, almost 
half a million Yemenis have been displaced 
by ﬁ ghting in the South and North of the 
country. One third of the population faces 
chronic hunger. In 2008, the UN World 
Food Program reported that 97 percent of 
Yemeni households saw family members 
either foregoing meals or taking up second 
jobs in order to pay their bills.4 This crisis 
will escalate further if expectations prove 
correct that see Yemen’s population double 
to more than 40 million within the next two 
decades. The prospects of Sana’a being able 
to tackle these challenges look bleak. Not 
only is Yemen forecast to run out of water 
by 2015, two years later it will also cease 
earning income from oil exports which 
currently support 75 percent of the annual 
budget. The lack of educated and reliable 
partners and the general weaknesses of state 
structures have made international donors 
reluctant to provide the kind of ﬁ nancial 
assistance that could help tackling the crisis. 
According to the most recent World Bank 
data, Yemen receives about a third ($21) 
of the average per capita aid granted to 
Sub-Saharan countries ($54).5
The Impact of Yemen’s Crisis 
on Saudi-Iranian Relations
Riyadh has a strong interest in the continued 
unity of Yemen to serve as a central bulwark 
against transnational or other regional actors 
using Saudi Arabia’s vulnerable southern 
ﬂ ank to undermine its security. In addition, 
sufﬁ cient stability would open up the possi-
bility of establishing the port of Aden as 
a central gateway for Saudi oil reaching 
the global market. This would make Saudi 
Arabia independent from a possible Iranian 
threat to the Strait of Hormuz. 
thereby undermining the MEC. In 2011, 
protesters seized an army base in Sana’a, 
while Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula 
(AQAP) has, on a frequent basis, been able 
to temporarily control several cities and 
launch deadly assaults on military bases 
in the southern province of Abyan. Such 
developments could offer AQAP the chance 
to use existing dual-use laboratories or 
even to build their own facilities capable of 
producing biological and chemical material 
in remote areas under their control.
Third, Yemen has the potential to play 
a more prominent role in the ongoing 
tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Riyadh has a long history of attempts to 
shape the course of political events in 
Yemen with which it shares a 1,800 km-long 
border. Saudi Arabia’s different reactions to 
domestic calls for change in Bahrain and 
Syria have made clear that it is viewing the 
‘Arab Spring’ primarily through the lens of 
its long-running conﬂ ict with Iran. From 
a Saudi point of view, instability in Yemen 
opens up the specter of increased Iranian 
inﬂ uence at a time when Tehran’s foothold 
in the Arab world’s northern tier comes 
under strain in the context of the popular 
uprising against the Assad regime in Syria. 
Fourth, a number of narrowly foiled 
terrorist attacks on U.S. targets and the 
2009 Fort Hood shooting in Texas have 
shifted global attention towards Yemen’s 
status as the home to Al-Qaeda in the Arab 
Peninsula. Continuing instability in Yemen 
allows AQAP to regroup and pose a direct 
threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and 
other countries on the Arab peninsula. It 
also puts AQAP into a position to intensify 
its support for the ‘home-grown’ attempted 
terrorist attacks the United States has 
witnessed over the last couple of years. In 
short, Yemen’s instability has the potential 
to allow transnational actors to undermine 
the security arrangements which the region’s 
state actors might contemplate as part of the 
envisioned MEC.
The Risks of Yemen 
as a Failed State
The Republic of Yemen faces various 
political challenges, persistently endan-
gering its unity and stability. The political 
landscape is deeply divided across tribal 
confederations, Islamist movements, and 
economic as well as military interest groups. 
For most of his rule, former President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh skillfully employed a policy 
of divide-and-rule that included patronage 
Table No. 1: Yemen’s Military Holdings 
in the Delivery Vehicles’ Sector
Name Type
Number in 
Possesion
Year of 
Delivery
MIG-21
Fighter 
bomber 15
1972; 
1979–1981; 
2006–2007
MIG-23
Fighter 
bomber ? 1979
MIG-29
Fighter 
bomber 18
1994; 
2002–2003
Su-7B
Fighter 
bomber
30
1979
Su-22
Fighter 
bomber
1980; 1995; 
2006–2007
Luna-M/
Frog-7
Missile 
launcher 12 1983
OTR-21/
SS-21 
Scarab
Missile 
launcher 10 1988
9M79/
SS-21 
Scarab
Short-
range 
ballistic 
missile
? 1988
Scud-B
Short-
range 
ballistic 
missile
33
Scud-C
Short-
range 
ballistic 
missile
45 2001–2002
Source: Modiﬁ ed and updated from Michael 
Haas and Bernd W. Kubbig (2012) ‘Appendix: 
The arsenals of actors relevant to a missile 
free zone in the Middle East/Gulf’, in Bernd 
W. Kubbig and Sven-Eric Fikenscher (eds) 
Arms Control and Missile Proliferation in the 
Middle East, London: Routledge, p. 326.
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For Saudi observers, AQAP is just the latest 
ideological threat to emerge at its southern 
border following former Egyptian President 
Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s Arab nationalism 
and South Yemen’s socialism. Most of the 
estimated $1 billion of annual aid which 
Saudi Arabia allocated has been spent on 
direct patronage of tribes.6 It is thus not 
surprising that Saudi Arabia’s key contact 
in Yemen was Sheik Abdullah al-Ahmar 
whose tribal confederation’s militia helped 
safeguard Riyadh’s interest during the war 
in Sa’da. That is why Saudi Arabia is eager to 
see Yemen’s tribes sufﬁ ciently represented 
in any future political scenario. The direct 
engagement with leading tribes is explained 
by some as reﬂ ecting Saudi concerns about 
the ineffectiveness of Yemen’s security 
services and about their sympathies for 
radical Islamists. Critics have blamed this 
approach for retarding the development of 
a civic culture that could support modern 
political institutions.
Saudi Arabia’s strong presence is a double-
edged sword for the international com-
munity. On the one hand, Western and 
other governments can beneﬁ t from an 
extensive range of informal ties between 
Saudi ofﬁ cials and key Yemeni decision-
makers to work towards the common goal 
of a stable and uniﬁ ed Yemen. On the other 
hand, Saudi Arabia’s vision of Yemen’s 
political future is at odds with the call for 
genuine political change put forward by the 
country’s reform movement. This became 
evident in a New York Times opinion article 
by Tawakkul Karman, the 2011 recipient 
of the Nobel Peace Prize. For her, the 
American aid to Yemen’s security services 
made the U.S. responsible for the killing of 
innocent women and children at the hands 
of the regime. She also accused Saudi Arabia 
of engineering a limited change at the top of 
the regime while trying to keep the corrupt 
and authoritarian political and security 
infrastructure intact.7
The ongoing rebellion in Yemen’s North 
has raised the specter of creating yet 
another theater for the ongoing compe-
tition over regional inﬂ uence between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. It is led by supporters of 
late Sheikh Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, 
a former member of parliament who 
was killed in 2004.8 Like other tribes 
in the Northern province of Sa’da, the 
Al-Houthis are following a Shia version 
of Islam as practiced by the Zaidi Imams 
who had ruled parts of Northern Yemen 
from 892 until 1962. Constituting one of 
the most powerful non-state actors within 
Yemen, the Al-Houthis justify their violent 
struggle for more political independence 
and religious self-determination with the 
expanding power of Saudi-sponsored 
Salaﬁ s, which are supported by Sana’a as a 
counterbalance against the Houthis. Sa’da 
is Yemen’s poorest governorate and stands 
economically and politically neglected by 
the central government, while suffering the 
socio-economic consequences of the bloody 
war between 2004 and 2010. Saudi Arabia 
also played a role in exacerbating tensions by 
helping to set up the Dar Al-Hadith center 
which was founded by Saudi-educated cleric 
Sheikh Muqbil Al-Wadi’i who converted 
from Zaidi Islam to the Wahhabi inter-
pretation dominant in Saudi Arabia. The 
Dar Al-Hadith, where several thousand 
students from around the world are taught 
strongly anti-Shia religious doctrine, is part 
of the village of Dammaj which lies in the 
immediate vicinity of Sa’da, the capital of 
the Shiite dominated Yemeni province. The 
political context of the Houthi rebellion 
thus highlights how Saudi Arabia’s attempts 
to safeguard its national security interests by 
trying to spread its particular interpretation 
Box No. 1: Map of the Republic of Yemen
Source: http://carnegieendowment.org/ﬁ les/yemen_tribes1.pdf (February 18, 2012).
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an attempt to explore the possibilities of 
better management of their relationships, 
thus appear increasingly tenuous. 
The Impact of Yemen’s Crisis 
on Regional and Global 
Counter-terrorism Efforts
Yemen is of special importance to Al-Qaeda. 
The Hadramawt province in the country’s 
Southeast is the ancestral home of Osama 
Bin Laden’s family. As a failing state, Yemen 
is highly attractive as a basis for AQAP and 
its afﬁ liates due to the easy accessibility 
of weapons. The Yemeni society is highly 
armed with six to nine million weapons in 
private hands.10 Since Yemen is not able to 
secure its long land border and coast lines 
of approximately 3,650 km, it also serves as 
a ﬂ ourishing international black market for 
all kinds of weapons. A further challenge 
stems from the fact that effective counter-
insurgency operations require active support 
by the local population. This runs into the 
problem that many Southerners resent the 
presence of the Northern military which is 
widely seen as an instrument of repression. 
Southern calls for greater autonomy or 
even independence are based on a history 
of political distinctness that saw many 
Southerners develop a sense of cultural 
difference.11 The South was controlled by 
the British from 1839 until 1967 and allied 
itself with the Soviet Union as the People’s 
Democratic Republic of South Yemen. Post 
uniﬁ cation, the failure of Northern elites 
around the Saleh regime to adequately 
address Southern demands for equal 
political rights has hardened their positions 
regarding independence. Many Southerners 
resent the North’s greater religious conserv-
atism as represented by the Islah Party 
and Saudi-sponsored Salaﬁ s. Tackling the 
specter of radical Islamists consolidating 
or even expanding their control over parts 
of Southern Yemen thus requires the rebal-
ancing of relations between the North and 
the South.
AQAP in Yemen
The strength and roots of AQAP nowadays 
are deeply intertwined with Yemeni history. 
While Sana’a failed to establish full executive 
control over large parts of its territory, a 
network of radical fundamentalists managed 
to create parallel structures mainly in the 
Northern areas, providing people with 
schools and social care. This network was 
further radicalized when Yemeni and Arab 
Mujahidin returned to Yemen from their 
ﬁ ght against the Soviets in Afghanistan in 
of Islam is increasing the risk of domestic 
strife in Yemen.
Iran’s Role in Yemen
For Iranian observers, Tehran’s role in 
Yemen is to a large extent a function of Saudi-
Iranian relations. They admit that, ideologi-
cally, Tehran may feel an obligation to help 
other Muslims in general and Yemen’s Shiite 
Muslims in particular in overcoming state 
failure and bloodshed. At the same time, they 
describe Yemen as too far from the strategic 
calculus of decision-makers in Tehran. 
However, current events in the region have 
the potential to change these perceptions as 
Tehran increasingly perceives a coordination 
of hostile activities against its vital interest 
by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. While the 
United States is seen as shaping and leading 
the international coalition to put political, 
diplomatic, economic, and military pressure 
on Iran, their Saudi partners are seen as 
applying the same logic at the regional level. 
Tehran increasingly leans towards the belief 
that there is a division of tasks between the 
two. This is important as perceptions have 
an obvious inﬂ uence on shaping political 
deliberations and decision-making. 
If Iran sees its regional inﬂ uence increas-
ingly under threat, particularly in Syria and 
Lebanon, inﬂ uential elites might become 
more willing to engage in areas of previ-
ously secondary or even tertiary concern. 
Such a decision would have important 
ramiﬁ cations for the region. Iran then may 
ﬁ nd Yemen an important strategic space for 
challenging Saudi interests and inﬂ uence. 
This means that, at the moment, Iranian 
contemplation of building important infra-
structures for deterrence and retaliation 
cannot be ruled out. In fact, media accounts 
have highlighted new U.S. concerns about 
increasing signs that Iran is becoming more 
active in the Sa’da conﬂ ict. Local tribesmen 
describe both warring parties as relying on a 
comparatively unlimited supply of weapons 
which can only be explained by outside 
assistance.9
For Yemeni observers, Iranian involvement 
goes beyond funding and also entails the 
provision of training facilities for Houthi 
veterans in Hezbollah’s training camps in 
Lebanon. They also point to the provocative 
presence of Iranian warships and submarines 
in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Yemen. The 
chances of implementation for a proposal 
put forward by some Iranian observers of 
a Track II endeavor, which would bring 
together Iranians, Saudis, and Yemenis in 
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the 1980s. In that decade the regime used 
the Salaﬁ  network and radical Afghanistan 
veterans to ﬁ ght the remnants of the Shiite 
monarchy in the North and also during the 
civil war in 1994 against a Marxist secession 
attempt in the South. Through this, radical 
militants have developed and maintained 
close ties to the regime and even became 
integrated into the security apparatus. The 
close links between the regime and radical 
Islamists are exempliﬁ ed through the 
persons of Tareq Al-Fadhli, a prominent 
Islamist, and his brother-in-law, General 
Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who both sided 
with the opposition against President Saleh 
in early 2011. In the past, U.S. observers 
have criticized Ali Mohsen for his perceived 
unwillingness to actively pursue those 
deemed responsible for the attack on the 
U.S.S. Cole in 2000. Tareq Al-Fadhli stands 
accused by some American observers of 
having been involved in the 1992 attack on 
a hotel in Aden which housed U.S. troops 
who were on their way to support the UN 
peacekeeping operation in Somalia.
While the old Yemeni regime’s closeness 
to the Arab-Afghan generation of radical 
Islamists is well-documented, Al-Qaeda’s 
current operatives in Yemen pose a more 
direct threat. Al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch 
was set up by the Yemeni national Nasser 
Al-Wuhayshi, a former conﬁ dant of Osama 
Bin Laden, and two Saudi nationals, Sa’id 
Al-Shihiri and Mohammad Al-Awﬁ , 
both of whom had been in detention 
at Guantanamo Bay and subsequently 
graduated from Saudi Arabia’s deradicali-
zation program. International observers 
put the number of AQAP members in 
Yemen somewhere between 100 and 600 
while Yemeni ofﬁ cial estimates are in the 
range of 500 to 700. The group’s inter-
national relevance is larger than these 
numbers suggest. This is highlighted by 
reports about Saudi, Iraqi, and Sudanese 
nationals among AQAP members. In 
an indication of transnational cooper-
ation, spokesmen for Somalia’s Islamist 
Al-Shabab have pledged to support AQAP 
in the wake of the increasing number of 
U.S. strikes against the group.
Hardly any country in the region is currently 
more concerned about AQAP’s role in 
Yemen than Saudi Arabia. Some of the 
weapons and explosives used in various 
terrorist attacks in the Kingdom are alleged 
to have come from Yemen. After having 
seemingly succeeded in stopping the spiral 
of terrorist violence which gripped the 
country from 2003 to 2005, Riyadh is now 
facing the prospect of AQAP members and 
sympathizers using Yemen’s instability to 
regroup in preparation for another attempt 
at AQAP’s ultimate goal, the toppling of the 
House of Al-Sa’ud. The increased profes-
sionalization of AQAP has widely been 
attributed to the inﬂ ux of Saudi radicals. 
The immediate nature of the threat became 
evident in August 2009 when Al-Qaeda in 
the Arab Peninsula failed in its attempt to 
assassinate Prince Mohammad Bin Nayef 
who leads the kingdom’s counter-terrorism 
efforts. 
The U.S. Focus on Yemen
The reemergence of a terrorist threat also 
explains why the United States began to 
refocus on Yemen after a longer period of 
inattention. This was prompted by the reali-
zation that radical Islamist Anwar Al-Awlaki 
had been in contact with Major Nidal 
Hassan, currently awaiting trial for killing 
13 people at the Fort Hood military base 
in Texas, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
who pleaded guilty for trying to bring 
down an American airliner over Detroit 
on Christmas Day 2009. Since then, more 
and more politicians and counter-terrorism 
ofﬁ cials began to expect future attacks on 
U.S. soil to emanate from Yemen rather than 
from Afghanistan or Pakistan. In reaction, 
the United States dramatically increased its 
military aid from $5 million in 2006 to $150 
million in 2010. Wikileaks cables showed 
that some U.S. support had been diverted by 
the Saleh regime to ﬁ ght the Houthi rebels 
in the North. This reﬂ ects the differences 
in threat perceptions that long plagued the 
American-Yemeni relationship. Whereas 
the U.S. and other international actors are 
preoccupied with the threat posed by AQAP, 
for the Yemeni government this issue has 
long been less important than the Southern 
secessionism or the Houthi rebellion.
The inability or unwillingness of the Yemeni 
regime to address the perceived menace 
posed by AQAP has prompted the United 
States to look for other ways of responding 
to this ever more urgent security threat. 
First, the U.S. increased its cooperation 
with Saudi Arabia which provides crucial 
intelligence gathered through its extensive 
network of contacts. Second, Washington 
made use of this intelligence by employing 
the same military instruments it began to 
rely on in confronting the terrorist threat in 
the border region between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Wikileaks cables published in 2010 
indicated that President Saleh had consented 
to the use of U.S. airplanes against suspected 
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terrorists, but opposed employing cruise 
missiles. The resulting increase in pressure 
on AQAP was also privately welcomed 
by Saudi counter-terrorism ofﬁ cials. In 
summer 2011, U.S. drone strikes supposedly 
helped Yemeni army units that had found 
themselves under siege by AQAP-linked 
ﬁ ghters in the Southern governorate of 
Abyan. Shortly thereafter, further drone 
attacks led to the deaths of Anwar Al-Awlaki 
and Samir Khan, the Pakistani-American 
editor of the English-language AQAP 
publication Inspire, in September 2011. One 
month later, U.S. drones killed Awlaki’s 
son Abdul-Rahman and the media chief of 
AQAP, Ibrahim Al-Banna.
Yemen’s Unrest and the 
Imperative of Genuine 
Political Reform
The uprising of the Houthi movement in 
the North since 2004, increasing calls for 
autonomy or even independence in the 
South since 2007, and a broader protest 
movement inspired by the ‘Arab Spring’ 
since January 2011 exemplify the political 
crises which Saleh’s authoritarian rule 
has brought about. When Yemen’s youth 
reacted to the events in Tunisia and Egypt 
calling for President Saleh’s resignation, 
his regime unleashed a wave of violence. In 
the most notorious incident, snipers shot 
and killed dozens of unarmed civilians 
on March 28, 2011.12 In reaction to this 
bloodbath, many senior army ofﬁ cers and 
parts of the army followed General Ali 
Mohsen Al-Ahmar and defected to the 
opposition. Their decision did not neces-
sarily signal enthusiasm for the demands of 
the youth movement. Rather, they reﬂ ected 
a long-simmering conﬂ ict within the ruling 
elite that was caused by President Saleh’s 
attempt to centralize power in the hands of 
a small number of family members. Before 
his defection, General Ali Mohsen had been 
in charge of the repression of the Houthi 
rebels in the North of Yemen and coordi-
nated support for Yemen’s Arab volunteers 
in the Afghan War of the 1980s. His break 
with Ali Saleh highlighted the fact that 
Yemen’s military cannot be considered a 
truly national institution, but merely an 
agglomeration of different ﬁ efdoms.
Tribal opposition to Saleh’s rule is person-
iﬁ ed by Sadiq Al-Ahmar, the sheikh of the 
Hashid tribal confederation, Yemen’s second 
largest. Sadiq’s brother Hamid Al-Ahmar, 
a wealthy businessman who serves in a 
prominent role in the Islah Party, and the 
prominent radical cleric Sheikh Abdul-
Majid Al-Zindani represent the Islamist 
opposition. The latter is named by the 
U.S. authorities as special designate global 
terrorist. The U.S. Department of the 
Treasury accuses Zindani of using the 
Al-Iman University in Sana’a, which he 
founded, for recruiting and ﬁ nancing mili-
tant Islamists. Already in the 1980s, he and 
General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar coordinated 
the mobilization of Yemenis for the war in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet occupation. 
The GCC Proposal and 
Power Transition
With these leading military, tribal, and 
Islamist ﬁ gures distancing themselves from 
the Saleh regime, the youth movement’s call 
for genuine political reform became increas-
ingly overshadowed by the bloody internal 
battles among members of the old elites. The 
Gulf Cooperation Council’s proposal, which 
included immunity for Saleh and his family 
members, was at ﬁ rst broadly supported by 
the opposition groups. Only after massive 
violence against protesters did large parts of 
the opposition reject this version of the deal 
and demand President Saleh to be charged 
for the deadly shootings. Saleh was forced 
to be medically treated in Saudi Arabia after 
he was seriously injured in an attempted 
murder. During his absence, Vice President 
Abdrabah Mansor Al-Hadi took over as 
Acting President. 
In early July 2011, the government rejected 
the opposition’s demands, including the 
formation of a transitional council with 
the goal of formally transferring power 
from the current administration to a 
caretaker government intended to oversee 
constitutional amendments as well as 
presidential and parliamentary elections. 
With its stalling tactics the regime hoped 
to undermine the opposition’s unity and 
unveil their internal cleavages. Tensions 
have emerged, in particular, between 
Yemen’s established opposition of the Joint 
Meeting Parties, dominated by the Islamist 
Islah Party and the considerably less inﬂ u-
ential Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), and a 
younger generation of activists that took a 
leading role in the protests erupting since 
2011. Islah had a history of close collabo-
ration with the Saleh regime before taking 
a more confrontational stance since the 
late 1990s. The YSP largely represents the 
leadership of the former South Yemen. 
While Islah and YSP shared the youth 
movement’s call for change, their ideas for 
a future Yemen diverge from the emanci-
patory and liberating visions of a new civic 
Box No. 2: Important Dates of 
Yemen’s Modern History
1839–1967 South Yemen under British 
rule (Aden Protectorate)
1918 North Yemen’s indepen-dence after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire
1962 Establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic 
(North Yemen)
1962–1970
North Yemen Civil War 
between Egypt-backed 
Republicans and Saudi-
backed Royalists
1967 British withdrawal and South Yemen 
independence
1970
Establishment of the 
People’s Democratic 
Republic of Yemen in 
South Yemen
1978 Ali Abdullah Saleh becomes President of 
North Yemen
1986 South Yemen Civil War
1990
Uniﬁ cation of North and 
South Yemen as the 
Republic of Yemen with 
Saleh as President
1994 Yemeni Civil War
2004 Beginning of the Houthi 
Rebellion in Yemen’s north
2011
The Yemeni Uprising: 
major popular protests, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh resigns
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used for the development of the country 
and not to shore up a corrupt system of 
patronage. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
As described, Yemen is more important for 
the Middle East Conference than generally 
recognized, for four reasons:
Yemen might store chemical weapons • 
and has imported various WMD-capable 
aircraft and missiles.
The country is one of the region’s eminent • 
weapons markets with the potential 
to serve as a major gateway for illicit 
weapons of conventional and unconven-
tional nature.
In the ongoing tensions between Saudi • 
Arabia and Iran, Yemen could play an 
increasingly prominent role. 
Yemen’s instability provides a basis for • 
Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, posing 
a direct threat to its vicinity and fueling 
‘home-grown’ terrorism in the United 
States.
In the context of the stated aims of the 
MEC, the Yemeni government would need 
to ensure that any existing stockpiles of 
chemical weapons within the country are 
secure and that a strategy to destroy all 
existing material covered by the BTWC and 
CWC is developed. Yemen’s compliance 
would be facilitated if Israel and Egypt were 
to agree to sign and/or ratify both conven-
tions. The international community also 
has a role to play in ensuring close cooper-
ation between the regional member states 
and the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons as the implementing 
institution by pushing for on-site inspec-
tions of the declared facilities. International 
technical support and assistance should 
focus on training and capacity building in 
terms of securing and protecting chemical 
weapons, on implementing the obliga-
tions of the relevant conventions as well 
as the aforementioned national destruction 
program. Finally, multilateral coordinated 
security cooperation and active technical 
support is required in the ﬁ elds of anti-
terror strategies, border control, regional 
anti-smuggling, security sector reform, 
anti-corruption programs, and sustainable 
rehabilitation initiatives for former 
militants.
The momentous long-term task of setting 
Yemen on a course towards political 
stability requires that all factions refrain 
political culture that has been a hallmark 
of the early ‘Arab Spring’.  
On November 23, 2011, President Saleh 
ﬁ nally signed the GCC deal, handing over 
power to Vice President Al-Hadi. This 
transition was reafﬁ rmed in a national 
referendum held in March 2012. Yet, the 
Yemeni crisis is far from being solved. An 
important step has been taken, but there 
are still key problems that could see the 
country descend even further towards 
instability. It remains an open question 
what level of inﬂ uence key political and 
military ﬁ gures from the old regime will 
play in a post-Saleh Yemen. Al-Hadi himself 
is a former general from South Yemen and 
belonged to President Saleh’s inner circle 
since 1994. The youth movement’s promise 
to institute a new political culture not only 
threatened the Saleh regime, but also the 
tribal norms that, along with Saleh’s under-
mining of effective formal political insti-
tutions, have for a long time contributed 
to Yemen’s lack of political progress. The 
weakness of state institutions, the division 
of the security apparatus through defection 
during the protests, and the fact that only 
some groups of the opposition signed 
the GCC deal, will undermine the ability 
of Al-Hadi or any successor to preserve 
unity and establish stability. The interna-
tional community and regional actors in 
particular can play a crucial role in facili-
tating an inclusive political transformation 
by offering mediation and monitoring 
services. 
Yemen’s government must now live up 
to the task of creating and expanding 
effective central authority in order to 
address the country’s various security 
and socio-economic challenges at a time 
when such expanded control is resented 
by people in Sa’da and the South alike. 
With Yemen further descending into a 
security vacuum, supporters of Southern 
independence will be strengthened by 
the increasing appeal of the model set by 
Somaliland which separated itself from 
the failing rest of Somalia. Addressing 
widely shared demands for greater political 
freedoms in the context of a more federal 
political structure could thus help diminish 
the prospects of Southern secession and a 
new escalation in Sa’da. What is needed is 
a genuine institution building and a rebal-
ancing of civilian-military relations in favor 
of the former. Genuine political reform 
would also mean that funds generated by 
Yemen’s diminishing oil and considerable, 
yet limited, gas resources would actually be 
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from any actions that lead to further 
violent escalations. It is incumbent upon 
all political actors to engage in institution-
alized constructive (and transparent) talks 
over a stable political future of Yemen. This 
is crucial to build conﬁ dence in the near 
term and ensure an inclusive and peaceful 
political process, considering peoples’ 
demands for a more democratic and trans-
parent political system, in the long term. 
The aim should be to develop a binding and 
realistic plan to approve amendments to 
the constitution and the election law which 
make future parliaments as inclusive as 
possible and strengthen active issue-based 
political parties as the central ingredients 
of robust democratic processes. 
Regional and international actors have an 
important role to play as well. First, they 
need to stop all military support to the 
government and oppositional non-state 
actors that could reasonably be expected 
to be used against civilians and protesters 
or escalate the confrontation. The inter-
national community and Western govern-
ments have to recognize that policies aimed 
at making Yemen a less hospitable place 
for transnational terrorist organizations 
need to address the underlying causes of 
instability by investing in socio-economic 
progress, rule of law, and democratic 
governance. This requires bringing 
security and development assistance into 
balance and safeguards against the abuse 
of military and security assistance for the 
suppression of dissent. 
Such long-term approach needs to cover 
investment in Yemen’s educational system 
to ensure that the current and future 
generation of Yemenis will be sufﬁ ciently 
qualiﬁ ed to gain entry into the job markets 
of Arab Gulf states and can interact with 
international donors in implementing 
domestic development projects. Economic 
reform proposals need to be tailored in a way 
that they support political progress towards 
democracy and address the social crisis 
associated with food and water shortages. 
The international community should also 
indicate awareness of the grievances of 
Southerners through dialogue and provide 
tailored development assistance in an effort 
to preserve the internationally supported 
unity of the country and to sustain Southern 
cooperation against Al-Qaeda in the 
Arab Peninsula. 
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